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DOCKCT^ 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 (i), I am 
enclosing a copy of the Utah Supreme Court's recent opinion in 
Monson v. Carver, slip op. (December 6, 1996). Because the 
supreme court ruled in Monson that the Utah Board of Pardons has 
constitutional authority to order restitution even when the trial 
court has not, that opinion essentially disposes of all of the 
issues in stilling v. Utah Bd. of Pardons. Accordingly, 
appellants no longer request a published opinion in this matter. 
Thanks for your time and assistance. 
Sincerely, 
E7^ 
Norman E. Plate 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
cc: M. David Eckersley 
This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Norman E« Plate, Asst. 
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ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice; 
Jon Bryan Monson appeals from the district court's 
denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he 
alleged that the Board of Pardons and Parole ("Board") committed 
various constitutional violations in setting his parole date and 
ordering him to pay restitution as a condition of parole. We 
affirm in part and reverse in part. 
The facts leading up to this appeal are as follows: On 
November 18, 1985, Monson pleaded guilty to the murder of a co-
worker, Phillip W« Kerby. Monson and Kerby had been involved in 
various thefts from their employer, and Monson shot Kerby in the 
back and chest to prevent him from disclosing information 
concerning the thefts. Monson then buried Kerby's body under a 
pile of rocks near Oakley, Utah. Kerby's parents reported him 
missing to police on October 3, 1984. His body was not found 
until May 5, 1985, when Monson's brother discovered it under the 
pile of rocks. Thereafter, Monson readily admitted his guilt and 
cooperated with law enforcement officers. 
F I L E D 
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Monson was initially charged with first degree murder, 
but the charge was reduced to second degree murder pursuant to a 
plea agreement. On November 18, 1985, upon the entry of Monsonfs 
guilty plea, the trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate 
term of five years to life for the second degree murder 
conviction and enhanced Monson's sentence by one year because he 
used a firearm in the commission of the murder, pursuant to 
section 76-3-203(1) of the Utah Code. The trial court also 
recoinmended that Monson receive psychological and substance abuse 
counseling and treatment while at the Utah State Prison. Shortly 
after entering prison, Monson was transferred to Utah State 
Hospital, where he remained until the end of 1992 as a 
participant in the public offenders program. 
On November 19, 1986, the Board held Monson's initial 
parole grant hearing. The Board made no parole decision at the 
initial hearing but ordered a rehearing to be held in November of 
1993, which the Board later rescheduled for November of 1992. At 
the November 1992 rehearing, Kerby's father was permitted to 
testify, and he questioned whether justice was served by allowing 
Monson to serve time at the state hospital rather than in prison• 
This sentiment was echoed by the Board member who conducted the 
rehearing, although he also indicated that Monson had made 
*commendable progress" at the hospital, had obtained his high 
school diploma and associate degree, was working toward a 
journeyman plumber's license, and that hospital personnel felt 
that he had "reached a maximum" and was Mwell rehabilitated." 
Shortly after the rehearing, the Board issued a formal order 
granting Monson a parole date of November 23, 1999, and imposing 
four special parole conditions which required that Monson 
(i) submit to random drug testing, (ii) have no contact with 
Kerby's family, (iii) not consume or possess any alcohol, and 
(iv) pay restitution in an amount to be determined. 
On January 19, 1993, Monson filed a pro se petition in 
the district court alleging that the Board had subjected him to 
cruel and unusual punishment and double jeopardy by refusing to 
consider and count the nearly seven years that he had spent at 
Utah State Hospital as time served toward his sentence. Monson 
later obtained the services of an attorney who, with leave of 
court and pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, filed an 
amended petition on November 3, 1993. The amended petition 
alleged that the Board (i) had exceeded its constitutional 
authority in ordering restitution; (ii) lacked statutory 
authority to order restitution at the time Monson's sentence was 
imposed, and thus its order violated the ex post facto 
prohibitions of the Utah and federal constitutions; (iii) failed 
to comply with certain procedural requirements when it ordered 
restitution; (iv) abused its discretion because its order of 
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restitution was for something other than pecuniary damages; 
(v) subjected Monson to double jeopardy by ordering restitution; 
(vi) was imprisoning Monson effectively for failure to pay a debt 
in violation of article I, section 16 of the Utah Constitution; 
(vii) inflicted cruel and unusual punishment and violated due 
process by exceeding the Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines 
("Guidelines") in setting a parole date for Monson; and 
(viii) did not provide Monson with adequate due process because 
it failed to give a detailed written rationale for departing from 
the Guidelines, failed to allow Monson to have an attorney at the 
1992 rehearing and present witnesses on his behalf, failed to 
credit Monson with precoramitment time served in jail and time 
spent at Utah State Hospital, and failed to provide an adequate 
rationale for his parole date. The Board answered and moved to 
dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted or, alternatively, for judgment on the 
pleadings, pursuant to rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c), respectively, of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure* 
The district court held a hearing on the Board's 
motions on February 15, 1994. In its subsequent order, the court 
ruled that there was no right tc parole under Utah law and that 
the trial court had imposed a valid indeterminate sentence upon 
Monson. Accordingly, the court reasoned, unless the Board in its 
unfettered discretion granted Monson a parole date, his term 
would not expire until his death. Because Monson was free to 
accept or reject any parole offer and its attendant terms and 
conditions, nthe Board cannot make [Monson's] sentence any more 
harsh than that already imposed by the court at sentencing,'' so 
that the conditions of parole actually imposed were not 
"punishment" forbidden by the ex post facto or double jeopardy 
clauses of the Utah and federal constitutions. Specifically, the 
court ruled that the Board is free to set any parole conditions 
that are legitimately related to an inmate's underlying crime, 
including the restitution ordered in Monson's case. The court 
then ruled that a grant of parole after serving fourteen1 years 
of a life sentence was not so harsh as to violate the cruel and 
unusual punishment clauses of the Utah and United States 
Constitutions. Accordingly, the court dismissed all of Monson's 
claims except those related to the Board's departure from the 
Guidelines. As to those claims, the court deferred making a 
decision until after an evidentiary hearing at which Monson would 
be required to prove that he actually relied on the Guidelines 
when he entered his guilty plea. 
1
 The district court's order mistakenly referred to a 
sixteen-year term of incarceration. In fact, the Board's order 
requires Monson to serve only fourteen years. 
3 No. 950199 
The evidentiary hearing was subsequently held on 
December 22, 1994. Monson and his mother both testified that 
Monson's trial attorney had indicated that Monson would actually 
serve about six to seven years based on the Guidelines if he 
pleaded guilty to second degree murder. Monsonfs trial attorney 
testified that while he conveyed his opinion that Monson would 
serve only seven to eight years, he had no personal knowledge of 
the Guidelines at that time and had simply given an estimate 
based on his general knowledge. The court then ruled that Monson 
had failed to demonstrate that he actually relied on the 
Guidelines when he entered his plea. Accordingly, the district 
court dismissed the remainder of Monson's claims, 
Monson now appeals the district court's rejection of 
the claims he raised in his petition. Specifically, he contends 
that (i) Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme constitutes cruel 
and unusual punishment; (ii) the Board lacks constitutional 
authority to order restitution; (iii) the Board's order of 
restitution violates constitutional and statutory prohibitions 
against ex post facto laws and subjected Monson to double 
jeopardy; (iv) the Board failed to follow proper procedures in 
ordering restitution; and (v) the Board violated Monson's due 
process rights at the 1992 rehearing by denying him legal 
counsel, not allowing witnesses to testify on his behalf, and 
failing to give an adequate rationale for its parole decision. 
Monson also raises several additional claims which were 
not included in his original or amended petition and which we do 
not address today. These additional claims are that the Board 
(i) failed to provide Monson with access to his Board file;2 
2
 Although Monson filed his amended petition prior to the 
issuance of our decision in Labrum v. State Board of Pardons, 870 
P.2d 902 (Utah 1993), he waited until after Labrum to request 
access to his file and did so, not by amending his petition, but 
by asking the district court for an order compelling the Board to 
release his file. On appeal, he does not challenge the district 
court's denial of that motion but contends that Labrum dictates 
that he should have received his file prior to the November 1992 
rehearing. However, Monson did not complain of the lack of 
access to his file in his original or amended petition, which 
were both filed prior to the Labrum decision. Thus, his 
subsequent request for his file does not qualify for the 
retroactive relief announced in Labrum, which was specifically 
limited to "a claim [then] pending in the district court or on 
appeal before this court . . . challenging original parole grant 
hearing procedures on due process grounds." Id. at 914. In 
(Footnote continued on the next page.) 
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(ii) violated the compulsory process clause of the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution by failing to allow 
Monson to have witnesses testify on his behalf; (iii) violated 
the speedy trial clause3 and rule 22 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure by delaying Monson's "sentencing" for some 
seven years after the entry of his guilty plea; (iv) is bound by 
the alleged representations of individuals within the criminal 
justice system that if Monson participated in the public 
offenders program, he would be paroled shortly after successfully 
completing the program; and (v) offends the separation of powers 
principles contained in article V, section 1 of the Utah 
Constitution because it makes sentencing decisions which are 
subject to limited and inadequate appellate review under rule 65B 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. We decline to address 
these additional claims because of our general rule that "issues 
not raised at trial cannot be argued for the first time on 
appeal." State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105/ 1113 (Utah 1994), This 
rule applies to all claims, including constitutional questions, 
unless the petitioner demonstrates that "plain error'7 occurred or 
"exceptional circumstances" exist. Id. Monson has not attempted 
to demonstrate the applicability of either exception, and we 
therefore do not reach the claims that he failed to raise in his 
original or amended petition and that were not addressed by the 
district court. 
Returning to the claims that Monson properly raises on 
appeal, we first state the relevant standard of review. N"When 
reviewing an appeal from a dismissal of a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus, we accord no deference to the conclusions of law 
that underlie the dismissal. They are reviewed for correctness." 
Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1994); accord Smith v. 
Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 790 (Utah 1990). In addition, "while *we 
must review the fairness of the process by which the Board 
undertakes its sentencing function, • . . we do not sit as a 
panel of review on the result.'" Neel, 886 P.2d at 1100 (quoting 
Lancaster v. Utah Bd, of Pardons, 869 P.2d 945, 947 (Utah 1994)). 
2
 (Footnote continued.) 
short, because Monson's request for his file was not pending 
before Labrum was issued but was raised only after that time, he 
is not entitled to the benefit of our decision in Labrum. 
3
 Monson does not specify whether this claim is based on the 
speedy trial clause of the United States Constitution, see U.S. 
Const, amend. VI, or of the Utah Constitution, see Utah Const. 
art. I, § 12. Because we do not address this argument, we need 
not resolve this point. 
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We first address Monson's claim that Utah's 
indeterminate sentencing scheme constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.4 Monson does not contend that the trial 
court erred in imposing an indeterminate sentence, but rather 
that the Board's unfettered discretion may be used to set release 
dates which allow for punishment disproportionate to the severity 
of the offense committed. He claims that indeterminate 
sentencing as implemented by the Board subjects prisoners to 
^mentally" cruel and unusual punishment because (i> they may not 
be informed of the actual amount of time they must serve for long 
periods of time; (ii) it allows the Board to rely on 
unadjudicated allegations of wrongdoing and ex parte 
communications in determining the length of incarceration; and 
(iii) it gives the Board unfettered discretion in determining 
periods of incarceration despite the minimum terms suggested by 
the Guidelines. We read these points essentially as claiming 
that when the Board's discretion is not bounded by the 
Guidelines, the terms of incarceration it imposes may be 
excessive. Similarly, Monson argues that his term of fourteen 
years of confinement, as ordered by the Board, is 
unconstitutionally excessive because it exceeds the six-year term 
suggested by the Guidelines. 
We reject these contentions insofar as they are 
premised on the concept that the Guidelines create a liberty 
interest or an ^expectation of release'' such that the Board's 
departure from them could amount to cruel and unusual punishment. 
We have previously said that "any ^expectation of release' 
derived from the [Gjuidelines is at best tenuous" because they do 
not have the force and effect of law. Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 
508, 511 (Utah 1994) (citing Labrum v. State Bd. of Pardons, 870 
P.2d 902, 908 (Utah 1993)); see also Foote v. Utah Bd. of 
Pardons, 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991). In this case, as is 
typical, Monson received an indeterminate sentence of six years 
to life. The Board, in exercising its discretion, could have 
denied Monson any parole date, with the consequence that he would 
have had to serve the maximum term of life in prison. If we were 
to credit Monson's argument that the Board's departure from the 
4
 Monson also asserted in his brief that Utah's sentencing 
scheme violates due process protections contained in the Utah 
Constitution. However, Monson's brief contains no argument 
specific to this claim and fails to cite to any "authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied upon" in violation of 
rule 24(a) (9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Accordingly, we do not address this issue. Walker v. U.S. 
General, Inc., 916 P.2d 903, 908 (Utah 1996). 
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Guidelines in his and other cases amounts to the imposition of an 
excessive punishment, we would, in effect, transform Utah's 
indeterminate sentencing scheme into a scheme of determinate 
sentences fixed by the Guidelines. This we refuse to do. *[S]o 
long as the period of incarceration decided upon by the board of 
pardons falls within an inmate's applicable indeterminate range, 
• . . then that decision, absent unusual circumstances, cannot be 
arbitrary and capricious/' Preece, 866 P.2d at 512. Likewise, 
we do not think that the Board's decision to permit an inmate to 
serve less than the maximum term of his or her sentence can 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment, absent a showing that a 
particular parole decision results in a term of incarceration 
that is grossly excessive, as we define that term below. We 
therefore reject Monson's claims as to the Board's parole 
decisions generally. 
We now address Monson's claim that his own term of 
fourteen years is unconstitutionally excessive. We reject this 
claim because Monson has not made the requisite showing to 
support it. When an inmate claims that his or her parole date 
decision imposes an excessive punishment, the inmate's "challenge 
must meet the test for cruel and unusual punishment in specific 
applications: ^whether the sentence imposed in proportion to the 
offense committed is such as to shock the moral sense of all 
reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the 
circumstances.'" State v. Russell/ 791 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1990) 
(quoting State v. Bastian, 765 P.2d 902, 904 (Utah 1988}). 
Because the Guidelines do not have the force and effect of law, 
mere comparison of a term set by a parole decision to the minimum 
term suggested by the Guidelines is insufficient to meet this 
test. Rather, an inmate must demonstrate that his or her parole 
decision results in an actual sentence that is disproportionate 
by reference to the following three factors: "(i) the gravity of 
the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences 
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and 
(iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in 
other jurisdictions." State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 269 (Utah 
1986) (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983)). Although 
both below and on appeal Monson set forth these factors and 
asserted that terms of imprisonment imposed by the Board are 
generally disproportionate in light of these factors, he 
presented no evidence to support this assertion. We have 
previously refused to address claims under analogous 
circumstances, i.e., when an appellant fails to properly cite to 
the record, under the justification that "a Reviewing court is 
entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent 
authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the 
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.'" 
Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline 
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Operating Co«, 909 P.2d 225, 230-31 (Utah 1995) (quoting State v. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (additional citation 
omitted))• That justification applies with even more force in 
the present case because any showing that Monson could make would 
critically depend on factual research into terms of imprisonment 
for specific offenses in Utah and in other states. It is not 
this court's role to conduct factual research on behalf of a 
party, and absent that research, we refuse to consider Monson's 
claim that his fourteen-year term of incarceration for second 
degree murder is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. 
We next address Monson's claims concerning restitution. 
First, he contends that the Board lacks constitutional authority 
to order restitution as a condition of parole. We disagree. At 
the time of Monson's crime, sentencing, and 1992 parole 
rehearing, article VII, section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
provided in pertinent part:5 
Until otherwise provided by law, , . . a 
Board of Pardons, • • . upon such conditions 
as may be established by the Legislature, may 
remit fines and forfeitures, commute 
punishments, and grant pardons after 
convictions, in all cases except treason and 
impeachments, subject to such regulations as 
may be provided by law, relative to the 
manner of applying for pardons; but no fine 
or forfeiture shall be remitted, and no 
commutation or pardon granted, except after a 
full hearing before the Board, in open 
session, after previous notice of the time 
and place of such hearing has been given. 
The proceedings and decisions of the Board, 
with the reasons therefor in each case, 
together with the dissent of any member who 
may disagree, shall be reduced to writing, 
and filed with all papers used upon the 
5
 We note that a 1992 amendment, which took effect on 
January 1, 1993, essentially rewrote article VII, section 12 of 
the Utah Constitution. We do not address the text of the 1992 
amendment in this opinion because it applies only prospectively 
and is therefore not relevant to Monson's claims concerning the 
1992 parole rehearing. State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296, 297-98 
(Utah 1985) (per curiam) ("A constitutional amendment is to be 
given only prospective application, unless the intent to make it 
retrospective clearly appears from its terms."). 
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hearing, in the office of such officer as 
provided by law. 
Utah Const, art. VII, § 12 (1992) (emphasis added). Monson 
claims that because the constitution does not specifically permit 
the Board to order restitution, it may not do so. Thus, Monson 
essentially argues the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius," that is, "the expression of one thing is the exclusion 
of another." Black's Law Dictionary 581 (6th ed. 1990). We have 
endorsed this principle only as an aid to constitutional and 
statutory interpretation, not as a rule of law. Cullum v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch., 857 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1993). Indeed, we 
have recognized that xx%it is a valuable servant, but a dangerous 
master.'" Id. at 924 n.6 (quoting Rio Grande Motor Way, Inc. v. 
Public Serv, Coram'n, 445 P.2d 990, 992 (Utah 1968) (additional 
citation omitted)). Rather, the critical aspect of any 
constitutional interpretation is to "divin[e] the intent and 
purpose of the framers," Society of Separationists v. Whitehead, 
870 P.2d 916, 921 n.6 (Utah 1993), and rules of statutory 
interpretation exist only to assist in this determination. 
Cullum, 857 P.2d at 924. Specifically, the maxim appropriately 
applies "Aonly where in the natural association of ideas the 
contrast between a specific subject matter which is expressed and 
one which is not mentioned leads to an inference that the latter 
was not intended to be included within the statute.'" Id. 
(quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 333, at 670 (1953)). 
We reject the argument that the language of 
article VII, section 12 leads to the inference that the Board may 
not order restitution. The constitutional language plainly 
states that the Board, "upon such conditions as may be 
established by the Legislature, may . . . commute punishments, 
and grant pardons after convictions." Utah Const, art. VII, § 12 
(1992) (emphasis added). We have held that this language confers 
plenary authority on the Board to impose conditions of parole, 
even absent legislation specifying particular conditions. 
Mansell v. Turner, 384 P.2d 394, 395 (Utah 1963) (upholding 
Board's imposition of banishment as condition of parole). We 
explained that *[t]he prisoner may reject the conditions and 
serve out his term," and we noted that if a condition should be 
unconstitutional, the prisoner need not accept it, in which event 
%%there :is no condition, and the sentence would have to be 
served." Id. at 395 £ n.4. We see no reason to depart from this 
interpretation of the constitutional language, and we reject 
Monson's suggested interpretation to the contrary. Therefore, we 
conclude that the absence of the term ^restitution" from the 
constitutional provision setting forth the Board's powers does 
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not preclude the Board from ordering restitution as a condition 
of parole.6 
Moreover, in 1985, the legislature established the 
statutory authority for the Board to impose restitution as a 
condition of parole by amending section 77-27-5 of the Utah Code. 
Board of Pardons Amendments, ch. 213, § 1, 1985 Utah Laws 597, 
597. That statutory authority provides in pertinent part: 
In determining when, where, and under 
what conditions offenders serving sentences 
may be released upon parole, pardoned, have 
restitution ordered, or have their fines and 
forfeitures remitted, or their sentences 
commuted or terminated, the Board of Pardons 
shall consider whether the persons have made 
or are prepared to make restitution as 
ascertained in accordance with the standards 
and procedures of Section 76-3-201, as a 
condition of any parole, pardon, remission of 
fines or forfeitures, or commutation or 
termination of sentence. 
Id. (emphasis added); accord Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5. Thus, 
because the Utah Constitution expressly allows the legislature to 
establish conditions of parole and section 77-27-5 of the Code 
indicates that the legislature considers restitution to be *a 
condition of any parole" which the Board "'shall consider," we 
reject Monson's argument that the constitution precludes the 
Board from ordering restitution. To the contrary, because the 
Board's statutory authority became effective on April 29, 1985, 
before Monson pleaded guilty and was sentenced, and before the 
Board held his 1992 parole rehearing, the Board had express 
statutory authority at his parole rehearing to order restitution 
as a condition of his parole. 
Monson next contends that because the amended version 
of section 77-27-5 was not in effect at the time he murdered 
Kerby in the fall of 1984, it was applied retroactively in 
violation of article I, section 18 of the Utah Constitution and 
article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution, both of 
6
 We also note that article VII, section 12 of the 
constitution omits the word "parole," yet Monson does not claim 
that the Board lacks constitutional authority to order parole. 
This omission supports our interpretation that the omission of 
express language authorizing the Board to order restitution does 
not bar the Board from doing so. 
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which prohibit ex post facto laws. We disagree• An ex post 
facto law is one that M^punishes as a crime an act previously 
committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more 
burdensome the punishment for a crime/ after its commission/ or 
which deprives one charged with a crime of any defense available 
according to law at the time when the act was committed.'" State 
v. Norton, 675 P. 2d 577, 585 (Utah 1983) (quoting Dobbert v. 
Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292 (1977) (additional citation omitted)), 
cert, denied, 466 U.S. 942 (1984), overruled on other grounds, 
State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986). Monson relies on the 
second clause of this definition when he argues that the order of 
restitution increased his punishment beyond the period of 
incarceration ordered by the trial court. 
However, the Board's assessment of restitution under 
section 77-27-5 as a condirion of parole does not increase 
Monson's punishment because, under the law in effect at the time 
he committed his crime, a trial court could have ordered both 
incarceration and restitution. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201. 
Thus, Monson had no accrued right to a sentence that excluded 
restitution. See Nortonf 675 P.2d at 585-86. That the 
legislature later conferred the procedural authority on the Board 
to order restitution as a condition of parole as part of the 
Board's inherent sentencing function, see Labrum, 870 P.2d at 
911, does not diminish the fact that the possibility existed at 
the time of Monson's crime that he would be ordered to pay 
restitution. Norton, 675 P.2d at 585-86. Accordingly, the 
amendment of section 77-27-5 did not change the sentencing 
alternatives which existed at the time he committed his crime. 
See id. at 586. Therefore, application of section 77-27-5 to 
Monson does not violate constitutional prohibitions against ex 
post facto laws. 
Moreover, the Board's order of restitution did not 
increase or make more burdensome the sentence imposed by the 
trial court. Rather, the Board offered Monson an alternative to 
the maximum life term to which he was otherwise subject. It is 
analytically impossible for us to place a monetary value on time 
spent in prison. Thus, the parole alternative, which combines a 
term of fourteen years with the payment of restitution, cannot be 
said to exceed the maximum life term imposed by the trial court. 
Therefore, we cannot conclude that the statute permitting the 
Board to order restitution constitutes an ex post facto law which 
"makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its 
commission*" Id. at 585. 
For similar reasons, we reject Monson's next 
contention, that the Board's order of restitution subjects him to 
double jeopardy. The Fifth Amendment of the United States 
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Constitution provides that no person "shall . . . be subject for 
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." 
The Utah Constitution also prohibits double jeopardy. See Utah 
Const, art* I, § 12 (M[N]or shall any person be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense."). Although Monson does not 
specify which of these provisions he relies upon, his argument is 
based solely upon federal cases construing the federal clause, 
and we therefore analyze this issue solely as a claim under the 
United States Constitution and federal law. See State v. Wood, 
868 P.2d 70, 90 n.4 (Utah 1993) (declining to reach state 
constitutional double jeopardy claim when appellant failed to 
argue for different interpretation under state law). 
One of the purposes of the prohibition against double 
jeopardy is to protect a defendant against the infliction of 
multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Holland, 777 
P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah 1989) (citing North Carolina v, Pearce, 395 
U.S. 711, 717 (1969))/ accord State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 35 
(Utah 1987). Monson contends that subjecting him to both 
imprisonment and restitution constitutes multiple punishments* 
We disagree because we do not consider the restitution ordered in 
this case to be "punishment." In United States v. Halper, 490 
U.S. 435 (1989), the Supreme Court considered SNwhether and under 
what circumstances a civil penalty may constitute 'punishment' 
for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis."7 Id* at 436. The 
Court held that "a defendant who already has been punished « . . 
may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the 
extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized 
as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution." Id. at 
448-49 (emphasis added). The sole test to be used in making this 
determination requires a court, on a case-by-case basis, to 
compare the harm suffered as a result of a defendant's conduct 
with the size of the civil penalty. Id. at 449-50; see also 
United States v. Ursery, 135 L. Ed. 2d 549, 564-66 & n.2 (1996) 
(summarizing Halper). If the amount of the penalty is so grossly 
excessive that it cannot be fairly characterized as compensatory 
7
 The Board initially argues that double jeopardy principles 
do not apply to Board parole proceedings because they are civil 
in nature. It relies on our statement that "double jeopardy 
principles apply only in criminal cases." In re McCune, 717 P.2d 
701, 707 (Utah 1986). However, recent federal case law clarifies 
that no "absolute and irrebuttable rule" exists that a civil 
penalty cannot be punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy 
analysis. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 442 (1989). We 
therefore decline to adopt the criminal/civil distinction urged 
by the Board, and to the extent our prior cases suggested that 
such a distinction was a dispositive factor in double jeopardy 
analysis, we hereby disavow them. 
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or remedial, then the penalty can be considered "punishment." 
See Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-50. 
Applying that test in the instant case, it is clear 
from the legislative scheme that restitution is not a 
^punishment" but a civil penalty whose purpose is entirely 
remedial/ i.e./ to compensate victims for the harm caused by a 
defendant and whose likely intent is to spare victims the time/ 
expense, and emotional difficulties of separate civil litigation 
to recover their damages from the defendant. We briefly 
summarize the relevant statutory provisions supporting this 
conclusion. 
The Board is required to consider restitution in 
accordance with the standards and procedures set forth in section 
76-3-201 of the Utah Code.9 Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(5). We 
turn first to that section which defines restitution as "full, 
partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim." 
Id. § 76-3-201(1) (d) . A victim, in turn, is "any person [who] 
the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result 
of the defendant's criminal activities." Id. 
§ 76-3-201(1) (e) (i) . Lastly, pecuniary damages are 
all special damages, but not general damages, 
which a person could recover against the 
defendant in a civil action arising out of 
the facts or events constituting the 
defendant's criminal activities and includes 
the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and 
losses including earnings and medical 
expenses. 
Id. § 76-3-201(1)(c) (emphasis added). Plainly, these 
definitional provisions limit restitution to that amount which is 
necessary to compensate a victim for losses caused by the 
defendant. In addition, section 76-3-201.2, which provides that 
an order of restitution does not bar a later civil suit against a 
defendant and cannot be used as evidence in such a suit, 
nonetheless provides that "the court shall credit any restitution 
paid by the defendant to a victim against any judgment in favor 
8
 Section 76-3-201 of the Code has been internally 
renumbered since Monsonfs 1992 parole rehearing. For clarity, we 
refer in this opinion to subsection numbers as they appear in the 
current version of the statute. These substantive provisions are 
identical to those which were contained in the 1992 version of 
the statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1992). 
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of the victim in the civil action." Thus, under the statutory 
scheme, the damages awarded in a separate civil suit cannot 
duplicate the damages a victim receives through court- or Board-
ordered restitution, thus ensuring that restitution serves only 
its compensatory purpose. Finally, the Board is limited to 
ordering restitution Min an amount not to exceed the pecuniary 
damages to the victim or victims of the offense of which the 
defendant has been convicted, or the victim of any other criminal 
conduct admitted to by the defendant to the sentencing court." 
Id. § 77-27-7(2). From the foregoing provisions, it is evident 
that restitution, when ordered by the Board, is indistinguishable 
from compensatory civil damages, and we therefore do not construe 
it as a ^ punishment" for double jeopardy purposes. 
We now address Monson's last claim pertaining to 
restitution, which is that the Board failed to comply with proper 
procedures when it ordered restitution. Specifically, Monson 
claims that the Board failed to consider the statutory standards 
set forth in section 76-3-201 as it is directed to do by section 
77-27-5 and that he was denied a hearing on the restitution 
issue. The Board counters that these issues are not ripe for 
appellate review because the Board has not yet determined the 
amount of restitution to be ordered and that it may ultimately 
determine that no restitution is due, thus rendering the issue 
moot. 
We first address the standards that the Board must 
apply in ordering restitution. Section 77-27-5 of the Code 
provides in pertinent part: 
In determining when, where, and under what 
conditions offenders serving sentences may be 
paroled . . • [or] have restitution ordered, 
. . . the Board of Pardons and Parole shall 
consider whether the persons have made or are 
prepared to make restitution as ascertained 
in accordance with the standards and 
procedures of Section 76-3-201, as a 
condition of any parole . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(5} (emphasis added). Section 76-3-201 
requires that trial courts take into account certain factors in 
determining whether to order complete, partial, or nominal 
restitution. These factors are: 
(i) the financial resources of the 
defendant and the burden that payment of 
restitution will impose, with regard to the 
other obligations of the defendant; 
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(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay 
restitution on an installment basis or on 
other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the 
defendant of the payment of restitution and 
the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court 
determines make restitution inappropriate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4) (c). In addition, section 76-3-201 
provides, "When the court determines that restitution is 
appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the court 
shall make the reasons for the decision a part of the court 
record." Id. § 76-3-201(4)(d)(i). We agree that the language of 
section 77-27-5 mandates that the Board musr follow both the 
substantive standards of section 7 6-3-201 and its procedural 
requirements. It must not only consider the four statutory 
factors when it orders restitution as a condition of parole, but 
it must also comply with the same procedural requirements imposed 
on a trial court, e.g., it shall make a record of the reasons for 
its decision. 
The record in this case does not demonstrate that the 
Board considered the statutory factors because it does not 
contain any explanation of the reasons the Board ordered Monson 
to pay restitution. The most likely explanation for this lack is 
that the Board had not yet determined the amount of restitution 
it would ultimately require. Nonetheless, in issuing its order, 
the Board has not met the statutory requirements. As a result, 
Monson appropriately sought extraordinary relief. See Preece, 
886 P.2d at 511-12. We therefore reject the Board's contention 
that this issue is not ripe for review. The appropriate remedy 
for the Board's error, however, is not to vacate the order of 
restitution, as Monson suggests, but to order the Board to comply 
with the statute by giving Monson an explanation of its decision 
which demonstrates that it has taken into account the appropriate 
statutory factors. Id. at 512. In so doing, the Board will no 
doubt determine the amount of restitution to be ordered.9 We 
9
 In making its determination, the Board may (i) request 
that the Department of Corrections investigate and file a written 
report on the amount of restitution that is appropriate in light 
of the statutory factors, and (ii) hold a hearing on the issue at 
which the inmate and the victim(s), after appropriate notice and 
access to the investigative report and other materials, may 
present evidence. Utah Admin. Code R671-403-2 (1992). 
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therefore reverse the district court's decision insofar as it 
found that the Board did not err in ordering restitution. 
We next address Monson's contention that he was denied 
a hearing on the restitution issue. Monson again relies on 
section 76-3-201(4) (e), made applicable to the Board by virtue of 
section 77-27-5. Section 76-3-201 (4) (e) provides, MIf the 
defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow 
him a full hearing on the issue." We agree that this provision 
applies fully to the Board. It requires that after restitution 
is ordered and after an inmate objects to the order, the Board 
must hold a "full hearing" on the inmate's objections. That did 
not occur in this case because Monson did not object to the order 
of restitution and did not request that the Board hold a hearing. 
Instead, he filed his petition for extraordinary relief in the 
district court. We therefore find no error in the Board's 
failure to hold a hearing on the restitution issue.10 However, 
if the Board later amends its order to specify an amount of 
restitution and Monson objects to the imposition, amount, or 
distribution of the restitution so ordered, he will then be 
entitled to a full hearing on his objection.11 
Finally, we turn to Monson's contentions that the Board 
violated his due process rights by denying him legal counsel at 
the 1992 rehearing, not allowing him to present witnesses, and 
failing to give an adequate rationale for its parole decision. 
We address these issues in order. 
We reject Monson's first claim that the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution guarantees him the effective 
assistance of counsel at a parole rehearing. The amendment 
provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to . . • have the Assistance of counsel for his 
defence.'' U.S. Const, amend. VI. Monson's argument is premised 
on our statements that in setting an original parole date, the 
10
 Moreover, we do not construe the Board's own regulations 
as requiring it to hold a hearing prior to ordering restitution. 
The procedure set forth in administrative rule 671-403-2 for a 
preorder hearing is clearly discretionary, because it states, "A 
restitution hearing may be conducted by a Board panel or hearing 
officer." Utah Admin. Code R671-403-2 (1992) (emphasis added). 
11
 Because a postorder hearing was not held in this case, it 
would be premature for us to address the due process protections 
that the Board may be required to give an inmate at such a 
hearing. 
No. 950199 16 
Board performs a function analogous to that of a trial judge in 
jurisdictions that have a determinate sentencing scheme. See, 
e.g., Labrum, 870 P.2d at 908/ Foote, 808 P.2d at 735. He 
therefore reasons that he was entitled to the effective 
assistance of counsel in reliance on our cases and federal cases 
that have suggested or held that a defendant has a Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel when a trial court imposes a criminal 
sentence. See, e.g., Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135 (1967); 
State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982) ("Sentencing is 
a critical stage of a criminal proceeding at which a defendant is 
entitled to the effective assistance of counsel."). 
Our cases, however, have not said that an original 
parole grant hearing is identical for all purposes to a 
sentencing hearing before the trial court. Rather, we have said, 
"The reality of original release hearings is that they are 
analogous to sentencing hearings and require due process to the 
extent that the analogy holds." Labrum, 870 P.2d at 908 
(emphasis added). In holding that due process requirements based 
on article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution may apply to 
certain parole proceedings, we necessarily rejected the 
categorization of parole proceedings as "criminal proceedings" to 
which other constitutional rights, including the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel in criminal prosecutions, might categorically 
attach. Because it is well settled that the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel is not implicated in noncriminal proceedings, 
Neel, 886 P.2d at 1103, we hold that the amendment does not 
require the effective assistance of counsel at parole grant 
hearings, including the rehearing at issue here. Cf. Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-90 (1973) (finding no constitutional 
right to counsel in parole revocation proceedings but holding 
that due process may require counsel in certain cases). 
To the extent that due process guarantees under the 
Utah Constitution may apply to Monson's 1992 rehearing,12 he has 
12
 Although the 1992 rehearing was not technically an 
original parole grant hearing, it was the first hearing at which 
Monson's release date was determined. We have stated, "Until 
that initial term is set, any proceeding at which the issue is 
considered must be perceived as a threat to the prisoner's 
liberty/' Neel, 886 P.2d at 1101, and we extended the benefit of 
our decision in Neel vto those parole hearings at which an 
inmate's release date is fixed or extended." Id.; see also Utah 
Admin. Code R671-301-2 (1992) ("In rehearings, the offender is 
afforded all the rights and considerations in the initial hearing 
except as provided by other Board policies because the setting of 
(Footnote continued on the next page.) 
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failed to show how the "participation of counsel at the hearing 
would have affected the accuracy of the information considered by 
the Board." Neel, 886 P.2d at 1103. Such a showing is necessary 
because our decision to extend particular procedural due process 
requirements under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution 
to certain parole hearings is grounded in the rationale that such 
requirements will substantially further the accuracy and 
reliability of the Board's fact-finding process. Id. Therefore, 
if an inmate fails to demonstrate how a particular procedural 
requirement will substantially further the Board's fact-finding 
process, we have no basis for concluding that a failure to 
provide that procedure operated to deny the inmate due process. 
Id. Here, Monson never asked the Board for the assistance of 
counsel and has not even attempted to make the requisite showing 
as to how counsel would have substantially assisted the fact-
finding process. Therefore, we cannot conclude that he was 
denied due process because ne lacked counsel at the 1992 
rehearing.13 
For the same reason, we cannot conclude that Monson was 
denied due process because he was unable to call witnesses on his 
own behalf. He argues that because oral testimony is more 
persuasive than written testimony, and because Kerby's relatives 
were allowed to testify, he should have been able to offer the 
oral testimony of witnesses favorable to him. Even if we were to 
accept Monson's theory that oral testimony is more persuasive 
than written testimony, which we do not on this record, Monson 
has failed to show how the persuasive value of a particular 
method of presenting witness testimony has anything to do with 
substantially furthering the accuracy and reliability of the 
Board's fact-finding process. In addition, we note that Board 
regulations in effect at the time of the 1992 parole rehearing 
provided, "An offender has the right to be present at a parole 
grant, rehearing, rescission, or parole violation hearing [and] 
may speak on his own behalf, present documents, ask, and answer 
questions." Utah Admin. Code R671-301-2 (1992) • From the 
12
 (Footnote continued.) 
a parole date is still at issue.") . Therefore, for purposes of 
this appeal, we treat Monson's 1992 rehearing as a proceeding in 
which due process guarantees apply. 
13
 Contrary to the implication of Justice Stewart's dissent, 
we have not categorically rejected a claim for assistance of 
counsel under the Utah Constitution's due process guarantees. We 
have held only that in this case Monson has failed to show that 
the denial of counsel met the standard of Neel. 886 P.2d at 
1103. 
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record/ it does not appear that Monson attempted to introduce any 
documents containing witness testimony to further the Board's 
fact-finding process; as a result, we have no basis for 
concluding that he was denied due process simply because he was 
not allowed the opportunity to present oral witness testimony. 
Furthermore, even if Monson had attempted to present such 
documents and the Board had refused to admit them, Monson would 
still have the burden of showing that such refusal was not only 
error, but was harmful, a burden which he has not met in this 
case. See State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992). 
Lastly, we address Monson1s claim that he was denied 
due process because he did not receive a detailed written 
explanation of the Board's parole decision following the 1992 
rehearing.14 He claims that he was entitled to such an 
explanation in accordance with the Board's rules and our decision 
in Preece, in which we held that the Board must comply with its 
own rules. Preece, 886 P.2d at 511-12. The Board's rule in 
effect at the time of the rehearing required that an "explanation 
of the reasons for [a] decision [be] given and supported in 
writing." Utah Admin. Code R671-305-2 (1992) (current version at 
Utah Admin. Code R671-305-1). Monson concedes that he received a 
preprinted form on which the Board checked off its reasons for 
its parole decision. The Board checked off five "aggravating" 
factors related to Monson's crime and six "mitigating" factors 
related to Monson's present characteristics. While perhaps not a 
perfect explanation of the Board's rationale, this document 
nonetheless satisfies the Board's own requirement that it provide 
a written explanation of the reasons for its decision. Because 
Monson has failed to identify with any particularity the type of 
detail he claims he should have received and has failed to show 
that such lack of detail was harmful to him, and because he 
received a written explanation, we conclude that he was not 
denied due process. 
In summary, we affirm the district court's dismissal of 
Monson's claims in his petition for extraordinary relief, except 
the claim that the Board failed to provide an explanation of its 
decision to order restitution which takes into account the 
statutory factors set forth in section 76-3-201 of the Code. As 
to this claim, we remand for the entry of an order directing the 
Board to comply with the proper statutory procedure. 
14
 We have already ruled that the Board erred in ordering 
restitution without providing an adequate written explanation; 
therefore, we read this claim as focusing on the adequacy of the 
Board's rationale for its release date decision. 
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Justice Russon concurs in Chief Justice Zimmerman's 
opinion* 
Justice Howe concurs in the result. 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice, dissenting: 
I agree with the majority opinion except with respect 
to one critical ruling: the right of an inmate to be represented 
by counsel at the original release hearing, which in most cases 
determines for practical matters the length of time a prisoner's 
sentence will run. The majority holds that a prisoner has no 
such right. I firmly believe that a prisoner does have such a 
right• 
In State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1982), we 
stated/ ^Sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding 
at which a defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of 
counsel." Id. at 1007 (emphasis added); see also Mempa v. Rhay, 
389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967). This Court has clearly recognized the 
essential similarities between the judicial sentencing proceeding 
and an original parole grant hearing before the Board of Pardons. 
In Foote v. Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991), we 
stated: 
If the trial judge sends the defendant to 
prison, the judge does not determine the 
number of years the defendant will spend 
there. That is left to the unfettered 
discretion of the board of pardons, which 
performs a function analogous to that of the 
trial judge in jurisdictions that have a 
determinate sentencing scheme. 
In Labrum v. State Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 910-
11 (Utah 1993), we held that criminal parole grant hearings are 
legally different from other parole proceedings, that the 
original parole grant proceeding is essentially a sentencing 
proceeding, and that the state due process clause applies 
thereto. Although the issue presented in Labrum was not whether 
one who had been convicted of a crime and sentenced by a court 
was entitled to counsel in the original parole grant hearing, the 
issue before the Court was the analogous issue of whether an 
inmate was entitled to due process of law in an original parole 
grant hearing. The Court stated, "The reality of original 
release hearings [i.e., original parole grant hearings] is that 
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they are analogous to sentencing hearings and require due process 
to the extent that the analogy holds." Id, at 908. 
A number of considerations strongly militate in favor 
of recognizing the right of a prisoner to counsel in an original 
parole grant hearing. One such factor is the necessity of 
avoiding factual errors in the Parole Board's decisions. As 
Justice Durham wrote in Labrum: 
Justice Marshall of the United States 
Supreme Court elaborated on the problem in 
the parole context in his dissent in 
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 
U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979): 
In fact, researchers and courts 
have discovered many substantial 
inaccuracies in inmate files, and 
evidence in the instant case revealed 
similar errors. . . . In this case, for 
example, the form notifying one inmate 
that parole had been denied indicated 
that the Board believed he should enlist 
in a self-improvement program at the 
prison. But in fact, the inmate was 
already participating in all such 
programs available. . . . Such errors 
in parole files are not unusual. E.g. 
Kohlman v. Norton, 380 F.Supp. 1073 
(Conn. 1974) (parole denied because file 
erroneously indicated that applicant had 
used gun in committing robbery); Leonard 
v. Mississippi State Probation and 
Parole Board, 373 F.Supp. 699 (ND Miss. 
1974), rev'd, 509 F.2d 820 (CA5), cert 
denied, 423 U.S. 998 [96 S.Ct. 428, 46 
L.Ed.2d 373] (1975) (prisoner denied 
parole on basis of illegal disciplinary 
action); In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal.3d 639 
[122 Cal.Rptr. 552], 537 P.2d 384 (1975) 
(factually incorrect material in file 
led parole officers to believe that 
prisoner had violent tendencies and that 
his *family reject[ed] him"); State v. 
Pohlabel, 61 N.J.Super. 242, 160 A.2d 
647 (1960) (files erroneously showed 
that prisoner was under a life sentence 
in another jurisdiction); Hearings on 
H.R. 13118 et al. before Subcommittee 
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No. 3 of the House Judiciary Committee, 
92d Cong., 2d Sess.f pt< VII-A, p. 451 
(1972) (testimony of Dr. Willard Gaylin: 
"I have seen black men listed as white 
and Harvard graduates listed with 
borderline IQ's"); S. Singer & D. 
Gottfredson, Development of Data Base 
for Parole Decision-Making 2-5 (NCCD 
Research Center, Supp. Report 1, 1973) 
(information provided by FBI often lists 
same charge six or seven times without 
showing a final disposition)• 
Id. 442 U.S. at 33 & n. 15, 99 S. Ct. at 
2117 & n. 15 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
Labrum, 870 P.2d 909-10. 
The Labrum opinion also refers to another factor that 
weighs heavily in favor of recognizing a right of counsel at 
original parole hearings: 
Accuracy and fairness are essential in 
proceedings which impinge as directly on 
personal liberty as original parole grant 
hearings. 
The interests of both society and 
criminal offenders are best served when 
fairness and accuracy are assured at all 
stages of the sentencing and 
correctional process. An offender's 
perception of fairness in the criminal 
justice system is thought to promote 
rehabilitation. Accurate sentencing and 
parole decisions also further society's 
interest in ensuring that offenders will 
be returned to society neither sooner 
nor later than is appropriate. 
Finally, the criminal justice 
system as a whole values and protects 
accuracy and the appearance of fairness 
. . . . For the approximately ninety 
percent of all criminal defendants who 
plead guilty, . . . sentencing and 
parole represent the primary basis for 
evaluating the fairness of the criminal 
justice system. 
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Note, A Proposal to Ensure Accuracy in 
Presentence Investigation Reports/ 91 Yale 
L.J. 1225, 1241-42 (1982). 
Labrum/ 870 P.2d at 910. 
The majority opinion incorrectly indicates that by 
holding the due process clause of the Utah Constitution 
applicable to initial parole determination hearings, "we 
necessarily rejected the categorization of parole proceedings as 
%criminal proceedings' to which other constitutional rights, 
including the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal 
prosecutions, might categorically attach." That is simply not/ 
in my view, correct. Of course, parole termination proceedings 
are, according to a long line of cases, civil in nature. The 
Court did/ however, in Labrumy make quite clear that the original 
parole grant hearing in which a "parole release date" is set is 
"inherently a sentencing function." Id. at 911. Furthermore, 
the Court's rejection of plaintiff's position in this case on the 
ground that he had failed to show that the participation of 
counsel at the hearing "would have affected the accuracy of the 
information considered by the court" begs the essential question. 
It is the appearance of counsel that enables a convicted person 
to show inaccuracy or mistakes in the Board's sentencing 
proceedings. The failure of this plaintiff, unaided by counsel, 
to do so is hardly an argument for not recognizing his right to 
such a fundamental aspect of a fair procedure. 
In my view, an original parole grant hearing is part 
and parcel of the sentencing procedure in this state's 
indeterminate sentencing scheme, and for that reason, plaintiff 
is constitutionally entitled to the effective assistance of 
counsel in those proceedings. 
For that reason, I respectfully dissent. 
Justice Durham concurs in Associate Chief Justice 
Stewart's dissenting opinion. 
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